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In the past five years, following the 2000 Florida election fiasco, the voting technologies used in the United 
States have undergone a significant change.  The use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines 
has increased and provided great opportunities for advances in accessibility and voting user interface 
design. Auditing steps of elections is important.  Demonstrating that a computer program in a optical scan 
or DRE system is collecting them correctly must be done by testing and might be improved by redundant 
media created by separate means (electronic, or physical).  One audit trail proposal is for the Voter Verified 
Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT).  The VVPAT system adds a printer to a machine and adds an extra step to the 
end of the voting process when the voter prints out and approves a paper receipt of their vote.  We have 
introduced the idea of a voter verified audio audit transcript trail (VVAATT).  A VVAATT system adds 
audio feedback to the voting process.  The audio feedback is recorded and the recording serves as an audit 
for the election. 
We designed a study to understand the ability of people to verify that what they voted on a ballot coincides 
with what they receive as verification. This study assesses some of the most important factors to voting and 
audit systems, general usability of the system, the time needed for voters to use the system, and the number 
of errors voters were able to catch in each audit trail.   
In all the verification systems VVPAT is quite simple: The voter uses the DRE to record their choices.  
When they are finished recording their choices, they press a button on the DRE and a printout appears 
behind a glass panel. The voter must read over the printout to verify that their selections have been properly 
recorded on the paper. If the voter accepts the printout then the paper is deposited in a secured ballot box.  
Otherwise, if the voter rejects the printout, they will have to begin voting again.  Rejected paper ballots are 
not deposited in the ballot box.   
The procedure a for voter using the VVAATT system is even simpler: each time the voter makes a 
selection, the cassette tape visibly revolves, the record level light fluctuates and the headphones confirm it.  
For example, when the voter selects candidate A, the DRE will say “selected candidate A”. As the voter is 
listening to the audio feedback, it is recorded on a physical medium such as an audio cassette. At the end of 
the session the voter submits their ballot and leaves the voting booth. 
One important difference is the timing of the verification process.  When using a VVPAT, all verification is 
delayed till the end of the voting process, however, with a VVAATT verification is done throughout the 
voting process.  Eliminating this time delay means that the voter does not have to rely on their memory, 
often of dozens of race selection choices, to properly verify their votes.  In addition, accidental mistakes 
such as pressing the wrong candidate are immediately identified with the audio feedback.  The other main 
difference between the two systems is that VVAATT is provided though a separate modality in an attempt 
to make comparison simpler and to reduce cognitive load of verification while VVPAT does not.  The 
VVAATT audio verification complements the visual verification that the voter receives from the DRE.  
Instead of competing for the voter’s attention, the two forms of feedback actually combine to heighten the 
voter’s attention and create a more engaging voting process.   
To uncover the value of electronic selection verification we conducted a user study involving 36 paid 
subjects.  When comparing the two systems, we focused our study on determining how easy it was for 
voters, how long it took voters, and how many errors users were able to find with each system. 
This study used the Low Error Voter Interface (LEVI) shown to reduced voters errors as compared to some 
of the current commercial DRE interface styles.  This should have improved voters ability to be aware of 
their votes and help verification. The VVPAT system was implemented with a commercial receipt printer 
similar to VVPAT receipt printers available on today’s DREs. The VVAATT system used a standard Sony 
voice operated cassette tape recorder, and headphones like those supplied for sightless voters.    
Each subject voted on both the VVPAT and the VVAATT systems.  They completed 4 elections on each 
system.  Each election consisted of 11 races with a mixture of single selection races and multiple selection 
races.  For each election, we gave the subjects directions on how they should vote.   
Each subject voted three elections which contained an error and one election which had no error.  The three 
kinds of errors that we inserted in the audit trail were replacing the candidate the voter voted for with a 
different candidate, removing a vote for any candidate, and removing a whole race from the audit trail.  In 
all cases, the visual feedback that appeared on the screen and in the final review screen of the DRE was 
accurate, only the audit trail, either the paper receipt or the audio feedback was inaccurate.   
The most startling results from our study concerned the number of errors that voters were able to 
identify. We noted the number of errors that voters reported to us as they were voting. . The numbers at 
each level are quite startling.  Out of 108 elections that contained errors, 14 errors were reported to us in the 
VVAATT audit while no errors were reported in the VVPAT audit.  In our post-survey data 85 percent of 
participants agreed with the statement that there were errors in the audio verification while only 8 percent 
agreed with this statement for the paper trail. Almost a third of participants actually disagreed with the 
statement about errors in the paper trail. 
The full audio feedback audit record of the election, did add time to the process.  Possibly because they 
falsely found no problems with paper people said that they would recommend the VVPAT system.   
Experiences watching peoples reactions to second chance voting and VVPAT verification systems has been 
revealing as well.  Our VTP results in 2000 showed precinct counting improved optical scan ballots. My 
concerns for the value of voters viewing forensic paper trails came from watching the role out of the ESS 
PBC2100 in Cook county and Chicago in 2002.  Dedicated poll workers were on hand to encourage voters 
to check for errors as paper trails pointed out errors on ballots, voters refused to fix mistakes.  In Nevada I 
watched in surprise as 1 in 20 of the paper trail machines jammed during set up or on the day of election.  
After voting with a DRE that presented a paper record; a voter still spiritedly repeated the rhetoric “but how 
can I know how the machine counted my vote without a paper receipt”. I watched in dismay at a polling 
place where the one poll worker at  trained with the technology called in about a jammed printer then took 
it over to a counter and without supervision, cut out the offending paper trail with who knows what ability 
to follow any process to keep it with the rest of the paper trail.  The paper trails in Nevada are printed on 
thermal paper.  It was very hot that day.  A thermal printout might turn black if heated on a dashboard, or in 
a kitchen oven or microwave in a kitchen found in a rooms adjacent several of the polling locations. The 
paper trail printer has a power plug that goes into the voting machine without a way of securing it. In over 
220 machines in Nevada I saw no printer ballot box with a seal on it. 
Luckily I don’t believe any of the poll workers I met had any mal intent. I do wonder however about the 
fact that the printers are an extra device which might seem somehow ancillary and are not treated with the 
care and process of the voting machine. Added equipment and effort cause confusion.   
To defraud a VVPAT machine a hacker might make the machine skip a race or appear to have a bad 
printer, perhaps by making the printer skip a race while printing, or simply by making an unreadable 
section on the receipt.  This could be used to cover up software defrauding of the electronic vote or it could 
hide changes in the vote inside the computer.   
In making the VVPAT and electronic ballot disagree, the defrauder could be calling into question the 
quality of technology to create a reason to call for a new election. 
In a likely scenario, the defrauder will change the electronic ballot and depend on the statistics for reading 
and contesting bad receipts. If a person calls their receipt into question and asks for another receipt to be 
printed, the hacked VVPT machine can print the “duplicate” receipt correctly, fixing the “printer” mistake.   
By printing the correct receipt when a person asks for it a second time it could literally eliminate the 
changed ballot, thus eliminating the possibility of detection.  If we generously considered that the people 
that didn’t mention a problem but noticed one did report it. The hacker could change one in 75 votes and 
still wouldn’t expect to have more than one complaint per day per polling place.  When a voter complains 
and it comes to the attention of one of the several ballot workers that are running the election in a balloting 
area, it is likely to be caused by simple ergonomic problems.  If it is because of the fraudulent VVPAT, it 
will likely be the first time the ballot worker encounters this problem, which will make it harder to handle 
correctly than if they encountered it often.  They are likely to encourage the voter to reprint the receipt that 
would, allow the voting machine to fix the internal count and print the correct receipt to cover up the fraud.  
If the ballot worker does enter the balloting area where the voter is, in order to verify the legitimacy of a 
problem with a VVPAT, then they would have compromised the secrecy of that ballot. Even if they did 
enter the voters balloting booth to observe the strangely printed receipt, the natural reaction to an 
unreadable receipt would be to print a duplicate receipt.  Exchanging printers would also reprint the ballot, 
thereby eliminating the evidence.  Shutting down the machine is the only thing that would preserve the 
fraud to view later, but this would disenfranchise other voters. 
Today’s verification experiments do not show that we have produced a paper method that can be verified 
by voters. VVPAT can themselves be used as part of a hacking scheme. Further, counting paper is 
notoriously delivers 2 to 3 errors per thousand. 
Evidence suggests that most votes are lost registration problems, machine user experience and polling place 
problems.  While verification experiments might suggest more experiments to test other styles of paper 
trails, it is clear that these first tests with VVPAT do not bode well for there inclusion in imminent 
legislation to require this specific verification mechanism. We must require the solutions we propose to be 
improvements before we legislate them as improvements. 
We know many ways to improvement to voting accuracy and reliability that can be implemented with 
testing training and process.  Testing has found many problems with voting equipment.  Forensic analysis 
of tallys has allowed people to correct counting errors as well.  Let’s look to creating voting approaches 
that increase end to end auditing and increase redundant records of the process in ways that don’t 
complicate the voter experience or create a questionable forensic data as current paper trails seem to. 
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